From the Other Side of the Line
A Kashmiri activist from Pakistan-administered Kashmir on their struggle for self-determination.
Illustration by Jamhoor, created using publicly available image
In 2023, Kashmiris in Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) came together to form the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), rallying behind a 38-point Charter of Demands. These ranged from access to subsidized food rations to greater democratic governance and control over the region’s economic development. When the government stalled on implementing these demands, the committee answered with a wave of strikes and demonstrations, first in 2024, then again in 2025 and most recently this June. On June 4, the AJK government declared JAAC a proscribed organization.
Jamhoor editor Hashim bin Rashid interviewed an activist from JAAC, kept anonymous for security reasons, about the protests and political repression in Kashmir.
Hashim (H): What is the current situation in Pakistan-administered Kashmir?
Activist (A): The public is deliberately not told about the history of the struggle. On September 29 2025, there were major protests in AJK, which culminated in a long march on October 1. On October 4, the government accepted the Charter of Demands with a three-month timeline for implementation.
JAAC announced a long march on June 9 of this year after there was no implementation of the October 4 agreement. On June 4, JAAC was declared a proscribed organization, and a government crackdown started on June 5. Protestors were fired upon.
H: What is the history of JAAC? How did it emerge?
A: Over the last decade, various Awami (People’s) Action Committees emerged in AJK, spontaneously and simultaneously. Nationalist and progressive organizations kept facing crackdowns. We felt it was necessary to build a mass movement that brought together these different groups and committees, including traders and transporters.
In 2019, when India abolished Article 370 in Kashmir, there were protests and demonstrations in AJK. When the Pakistan government responded with repression, people became disillusioned. The people’s committees began to grow after this.
“When the Pakistan government responded with repression (towards protests against India’s revocation of Article 370), people became disillusioned. The people’s committees began to grow after this.”
In 2023, a lot of the problems people were facing came to a head. Different divisions in AJK face different problems. In Mirpur, there was loadshedding. Promises were made when Mangla Dam was built to provide free electricity to Mirpur, which is a hotter region. Yet the price of electricity increased significantly. In the Poonch district, the price and allocation of wheat became a major issue. In August 2023, there were local sit-ins around these issues, which spread across AJK. People began to burn electricity bills.
In September 2023, the people leading the protests at the tehsil (sub-district) level came together to form JAAC, with the action committees working under this structure. We called for a wheat subsidy and the creation of a “national electricity grid.” A 10-point agenda around electricity was created, which included the tariffs and renegotiating royalties.
On May 11 2024, JAAC had another long march towards Muzaffarabad. On May 13, the government accepted the demand for the price of electricity to be reduced to half. We demanded that this should be ratified constitutionally. After the long march, in October 2024, the government issued a presidential ordinance that imposed restrictions on the right to assembly, allowing only “registered organizations” to protest. This was essentially directed against JAAC and its action committees.
On December 5 2024, large demonstrations and sit-ins blocked major entry points across AJK to demand implementation of the 10-point charter. When the government refused, JAAC returned to the people and expanded its demands. That process of consultation gave rise to the movement of September 29 2025, whose 38-point charter we are now fighting to see implemented.
H: The movement has used the slogan, “Haq-i-Malikiyat, Haq-i-Hukmarani” (Right to Ownership, Right to Governance). What do these mean in the context of AJK?
A: Haq-ie-Malikiyat is the right to our resources. We want the implementation of the 2019 AJK High Court ruling to renegotiate all hydropower projects with the Pakistan government, and greater say in future infrastructure projects.
The demand for Haq-i-Hukmarani is about our right to represent and govern ourselves. The AJK government has long been controlled through reserved seats. Of the 53 seats in the AJK assembly, 12 are reserved for Kashmiri refugees residing across Pakistan. There are also 8 reserved seats for women, technocrats and ulema. These seats are often used to control the AJK government from the Centre.
The Centre has the ability to take down the government. In 2006-2011, there were four prime ministers. Between 2011-2026, there were another four prime ministers. The people feel that the AJK governments are being manipulated from the Center. One of our main demands is to end the 12 reserved seats.
There is also another issue. Gilgit Baltistan, which is a key part of Kashmir, has no seats in the assembly. For almost 80 years, Gilgit Baltistan has been separated from AJK.
H: Does the movement prioritize any of the demands?
A: The demands fall into different categories. Some are broader, like removing government bureaucratic privileges and abolishing the refugee seats. Others have a more local impact, like calls for health units and CT scan machines. Other demands concern infrastructure and development projects.
There is a long history behind some of these demands. One example is the demand for the construction of Shountar Tunnel to connect Gilgit-Baltistan to the Neelum Valley and Muzaffarabad. Historically, the princely state of Jammu Kashmir had routes to Gilgit Baltistan. After Gilgit Baltistan went to the Pakistan federation, the routes between GB and AJK were deliberately destroyed to break the connection between the people and their struggles. In 2008, the National Student Federation took out a “wahdat [unity] march” to restore these routes. During this march, the government killed two young protestors.
“The demand for the construction of Shountar Tunnel asks for restoration routes between Gilgit Baltistan and AJK, which were deliberately destroyed to break the connection between the people and their struggles.”
Similarly, we demand the construction of the Azadparan Road, because a dam was built without a proper survey, rendering the road unusable and damaging the surrounding land. This demand is about infrastructure, but also about climate and the environment. Since the 2019 earthquakes, in which a focal point was Mirpur, there has been a call for a geological survey to assess if this seismic activity is linked to hydel pressure. A movement in Mirpur has developed around this demand.
Police firing tear gas to disperse protestors during the October 2025 protests in Muzaffarabad. Image: Naseer ud Din/Reuters
H: What is the current state of the crackdown? Are there any negotiations?
A: It is a complete crackdown. Those traders who kept their shops shut are being picked up. Traders have been forced to open shops. There are no formal negotiations taking place. Maulana Fazal ur Rehman and Hafiz Naeem have offered to intervene. JAAC has written to them, accepting their mediation. The AJK Bar Council Committee also approached the government and JAAC with an offer to mediate talks.
We do have a history of negotiating with the government. The October 4 agreement created three committees where government officials met JAAC members. The last committee meeting was the week before JAAC was declared a banned organization.
H: What has been the role of the AJK Assembly in the movement?
A: The tenure of the current AJK Assembly was completed in June of this year. On June 8, the election schedule was announced with elections on July 27.
When the assembly is in session, the AJK prime minister holds limited authority. Real power is usually split between the inspector general and the chief secretary of AJK, both of whom are Pakistani appointees who answer to Islamabad. They don’t listen to the AJK prime minister. With the assembly now out of session, that power rests with the election commissioner.
It was the AJK inspector general who asked for more police support against JAAC, which led to 14,000 personnel being deployed. The AJK Interior Ministry issued the notification declaring JAAC a banned organization.
Before the end of its term, the last resolution presented in the AJK Assembly was for talks with JAAC. In previous talks, the AJK prime minister appointed two cabinet members in the committees, but they had no power.
This is where the demand for Haq-i-Hukmarani comes from. We have no autonomy. AJK is governed by the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and the Interim Constitutional Act of 1974, both of which give more power to the Government of Pakistan. The AJK Assembly has limited power to finance infrastructure projects. The development budget is under Rs50 billion. JAAC has also demanded that the role of the bureaucracy be restricted. AJK is a small territory, but there are over 100,000 government officials who get significant perks. Despite JAAC calling for a reduction of these perks, the AJK Assembly approved an increase of perks for bureaucrats.
In this context, JAAC has taken up the role of a true people’s assembly.
Protests during the recent JAAC strike in Neelum Valley, AJK. Image: Naseer ud Din/Reuters
H: The government of Pakistan has highlighted the demand for removing the 12 refugee seats as the only remaining controversial point. It also claims that conceding to this demand would undermine the case for a united Kashmir. How does JAAC address this criticism?
A: The Pakistan government claims to have accepted 36 of JAAC’s demands, but says it cannot accept the demand to abolish the 12 refugee seats because it is unconstitutional. It has also presented this as the movement’s only demand, declaring it will not accept this demand to protect the Kashmir freedom movement. This is a narrative war, which they have used to argue that the mobilization is “India-funded.”
First, they need to present evidence of accepting the first 36 demands. Second, there is broad consensus in AJK around the refugee seats. If you listen to speeches made at the people’s assemblies, speakers talk about rights and autonomy for AJK. Even the AJK politicians agreed that refugee seats have been used to derail the AJK assembly. They have changed their position under pressure.
The Pakistan People’s Party AJK president Chaudhry Mohammad Yasin agrees that the refugee seats are a problem, but they need to be proportionate. He has argued that elections for such seats should take place inside AJK, and it is the political parties inside AJK who should be allocated the refugee seats.
If someone does not live in a territory, if they do not pay taxes, if they are not resident there — how can they be their representatives? Seats in the AJK assembly are won by receiving over 50,000 votes. Some refugee seats are won by receiving 500-1000 votes. The refugee members of the assembly are given equal status with those who ran a full campaign. This is without getting into the issue of whether they have a genuine domicile in Kashmir.
H: Is there a history of mobilizations against the refugee seats?
A: Yes, Kashmiri nationalists, such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front and National Student Federation, have demanded the abolition of refugee seats since the 1980s. The core leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party has also asked for reform. Usually, the party that loses from these seats brings up the demand.
Within JAAC, the demand arose because of the conduct of refugee assembly members on the implementation committees, where they behaved in threatening ways. JAAC first demanded that no refugee member sit on the negotiating committees. The expanded charter then went further, calling for the removal of the refugee seats altogether. It was considered important for Kashmir’s political autonomy.
H: Let’s talk in more detail about the demand for “Haq-i-Malkiyat.” What does it include?
A: Haq-i-Malkiyat means local control over land, forests, and water. It is the right of indigenous people to improve their lives. Currently, all infrastructure projects planned for AJK require seeking funds from Pakistan, since the AJK assembly has no revenue other than land revenue and other small local taxes.
Through this right, we want control over our resources to shape our development and progress in AJK. This would be a local developmental, rather than an imperialist, model.
There is a narrative in Pakistan that Kashmiris take our resources. This is wrong. Kashmiris don’t get fair contracts for their resources. Some resources don’t even have contracts. Others are still on the Centre’s old terms. For example, Mangla Dam royalties are still at the old rates. JAAC has asked for the implementation of the 2019 AJK court decision to renegotiate contracts for hydropower resources.
H: There is a long history of grievances and negotiations around hydropower projects in AJK.
A: When Mangla Dam was built, it submerged the historic city of Mirpur. There is a narrative that Pakistan settled Mirpuris in the United Kingdom. This is incorrect. Mirpuris began settling in the United Kingdom since World War 2. There are lots of books on this. After Miripuris were displaced because of the dam, many moved to the UK through their own initiative.
There was even more displacement during the 2011 Mangla Dam Raising Project, where compensation was low. People were given Rs. 1.5-2 million, which neither allowed them to buy land or build a house. The Mangla Dam resettlement agreement used the term, zelli kunba (sub-family), to resettle the parents and children separately. This was not done. This remains a core demand of the Mirpur Action Committee. People settled on government lands have also not been given land ownership. There is also a demand for a survey of whether Mangla Dam is causing earthquakes in Mirpur. This is what happens when there is development from above.
Similarly, the Neelum-Jhelum Project created a major water problem for the people of Muzaffarabad. The Muzaffarabad Action Committee leadership comes from the Darya Bachao Tehreek (Save the River Movement), which was active in 2016-2017, whose demand was: “Save the river to save Muzaffarabad’s water.” There have been people’s mobilizations against infrastructure and development projects led from the Centre.
H: How did the abrogation of Article 370 in Indian-occupied Kashmir influence AJK activism?
A: In 2019, when Article 370 was abrogated in India, there were a few marches towards the Line of Control, where the slogan was: “Ye Khooni Lakerain Torni Hain” (Break Down These Bloody Lines).
“The long marches towards the Line of Control in 2019 created a new form, content and dynamism in AJK politics. People had reservations over Pakistan’s response and began to assert their Kashmiriyat.”
The turning point was the formation of the People’s National Alliance. AJK nationalists have demanded freedom for Indian-occupied Kashmir, but without connecting it to local issues. In 2019, the alliance began a march towards Muzaffarabad, demanding downsizing the AJK bureacracy. There was a crackdown against the march.
This became the basis for the idea that if we are to engage in a national struggle then we will need to connect with local struggles. People were already organizing on local issues. This led to the end of the People’s National Alliance and the emergence of the non-party civil society alliance of JAAC.
The long marches towards the Line of Control in 2019 created a new form, content and dynamism in AJK politics. People had reservations over Pakistan’s response and began to assert their Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri identity).
H: How does the class composition of AJK shape the protests?
A: In AJK, the class structure is that of a periphery. The local population does not control its resources. There is no big industry. It has been kept de-industrialized. In the small cottage industries in Mirpur and Kotri, workers are usually from Punjab. This means there is no Kashmiri industrial working class.
There is a strong small merchant class. Traders get goods from Pakistan and sell them in Kashmir. Traders have had a very important role in shutter down strikes and building economic pressure. In the last five-ten years, there has been a big influx of brands in Kashmir. This has impacted local trade since they cannot compete. They have been feeling disempowered.
There is also a large migrant working class in Kashmir. One or two people from each family work in Pakistan, the Gulf, or the United Kingdsom. There is a class and ideological differentiation between them. The Mirpur working class became connected to British working class politics and Labor Party activism, which has an influence in AJK. Some of them became elite, but most of them are still working class there. There are connections between the Kashmiri migrant workers and JAAC around nationalist and indigenous politics.
Locally, the heart of the resistance is in the Poonch district, which is a periphery within AJK. Moreover, the movement is stronger in the peripheries of each major city in AJK, where there is no agricultural development. People practice small-scale agriculture with some feudal remnants, and can barely run their household expenses. Someone from each family has to become a migrant worker. Moreover, there remain food shortages in AJK since local agriculture is not sufficient. There is some bigger agriculture downstream from Mangla Dam, which only supplies part of the local diet, but even then, food has to be imported.
Supporters of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) continue their protest while mourning a demonstrator who was killed during the October 2025 strike. Image: Reuters
H: Are there any class contradictions?
A: While the AJK middle class is part of the movement, it has a mixed role, since it tends towards reformism and opportunism. Middle class ideologies make the movement spontaneous and non-party based.
The opportunistic elements comes from this non-ideological space. The AJK elite is generally comprador due to its relationship with the Pakistani establishment. For example, early on, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)’s cadre began to connect to JAAC, but then it separated itself from the movement after the central leadership put pressure on their political workers.
H: What do you think will be the future of people’s struggles in AJK?
“The most popular slogan today is, “Shuhada ke Khoon se Inqilab Aae Ga, Masjid ke Minaron se, Inqilab Aae Ga” (The Revolution Will Come).”
A: The movement has become more progressive over time. The most popular slogan today is, “Shuhada ke Khoon se Inqilab Aae Ga, Masjid ke Minaron se, Inqilab Aae Ga” (The Revolution Will Come). There is deeper penetration of the movement within the broad Kashmiri masses.
Earlier, women would only come out for protests in Mirpur. In Pooch, even in a mobilization of over 10,000 people, there used to be only one or two female layers. Now, there is a huge amount of women in both big and local rallies. Even in the so-called “backward” areas, women’s participation is high.
The form of protest has also evolved in AJK. Local action committees are organizing different types of gatherings. This is creating a new culture. In the areas where there is water logging, there are events around this. Areas where there is displacement and lack of ownership rights, there is organizing around these.
Generally, a spontaneous movement creates a more reformist narrative, but the movement in AJK is moving towards a more transformative narrative. Different committees were formed, which included writers, workers, and women. The writers would organize literary events and festivals. Labor committees organized workers. These, of course, have their own histories.
In the future, the AJK movement will need to organize deeper given the governing classes they face. It is currently a mass movement with lacks ideological training and revolutionary organization. However, through its expansion, the consciousness among Kashmiris of being colonized, of being in an occupied region, is growing.
Hashim bin Rashid is a member of the Jamhoor editorial collective, and teaches on the environment and social movements at the University of Pennsylvania.
