The Enigma of Pinaki’s Populism
On Pinaki Bhattacharya’s Strategies to Fame as Bangladesh’s Most Popular Right-Wing Influencer
Illustration by Jamhoor, created using publicly available images
In the history of Bangladesh’s political commentators and influencers, Pinaki Bhattacharya is a phenomenon, ranging from being described as an “online human rights and political activist” to a “self-proclaimed anti-Hindu and anti-India activist,” depending on which media platforms are writing about him and when. Trained as a medical doctor, Pinaki initially became involved in leftist politics; in 2013, he was an organizer of the Shahbag movement, which sought justice for war crimes committed in 1971 by members of Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamist political party in Bangladesh. In 2018, due to the threat of detention by the military intelligence agency during the Awami League regime, Pinaki had to leave Bangladesh and seek political refuge in France. He has continued creating political content from there since then; his YouTube channel currently boasts more than four million subscribers. Ironically, Pinaki now serves as a major spokesperson for the Jamaat–National Citizen Party (NCP) coalition and has actively urged his followers to vote for the coalition in the upcoming 2026 general election in Bangladesh.
Although many critical scholars and activists in Bangladesh see Pinaki’s rhetoric primarily as propaganda, a large portion of his four million subscribers shape their political thinking and positions based on what Pinaki says. From Boomers to Gen Z, Pinaki has an enormous base that considers him a political guru and repeats his talking points in public political debates and discussions. Through his populist rhetoric, Pinaki has captured the power to shape a country’s political narrative and dictate political actions on the ground from afar, the most salient and terrifying one being the creation of mobs to attack institutions he deems as enemies of the state. Internationally, Pinaki has often been featured as an “exiled blogger” and “human rights activist,” and has been interviewed by international media platforms that have a narrow understanding of Bangladesh's complex local political dynamics.
“Through his populist rhetoric, Pinaki has captured the power to shape a country’s political narrative and dictate political actions on the ground from afar, the most salient and terrifying one being the creation of mobs to attack institutions he deems as enemies of the state.”
Pinaki’s rhetoric is a mish-mash of left-wing and right-wing political thought with a veneer of pro-Bangladesh sovereignty. In a country that had ostensibly adopted center-left to center-right politics since liberation, veering into authoritarianism in the last decade, it’s important to examine exactly which strategies Pinaki has so effectively used to shape political thought among the masses. What lies behind the enigma of Pinaki’s populism? In this piece, I will analyze his populist communication strategies using one of his videos, “Voter Agei Khela Shesh: Front Jitbe Kon Plan-e” [The Game is Over before the Vote: Which Plan will Win the Front?].
Populism is a political ideology whose core claim is that an elite establishment is working against the interests of the people. Populism claims to represent the people, positions the people against the elite establishment, and calls on them to fight those in power. Populists can be left-wing or right-wing. For example, in the United States, Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Zohran Mamdani all practice left-wing populist politics. Left-wing populists talk about how billion-dollar corporations control working-class communities, exploit them, and accumulate massive profits.
Right-wing populists, on the other hand, identify as the problem those who are “Others”—immigrants, refugees, and non-white people. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, India’s Narendra Modi, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and the United States’ Donald Trump - all practice right-wing populist politics. Narendra Modi repeatedly identifies Muslims as the problem. Trump has effectively declared war on immigrants, refugees, and Muslims. In this way, identifying an “Other” and attacking them as a way of protecting the “self” has been a classic right-wing populist strategy. Right-wing populism often takes an intensely nationalist form. Sometimes, right-wing populists oppose globalization as a means to protect national interests. Leftists, too, are usually major critics of globalization. As a result, the line between left-wing and right-wing populism often blurs for those with a surface-level political understanding. At times, right-wing populists borrow and appropriate elements from leftist arguments, making it sound—at first glance—like leftist politics, while in reality the politics is deeply right-wing. Pinaki is a perfect example of this.
Pinaki Bhattacharya gets interviewed by France24 on the July Revolution. Source: France24
Strategy One: Use of colloquial Bangla, comedy, and sexist slang
In Bangladesh, the tradition of political commentary using regional language and comedy was arguably pioneered by M. R. Akhtar Mukul. The most popular program of the Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra, the radio channel of the Bangladesh government in exile during the 1971 war of independence, was Chorompotro. From May 25 to December 16, 1971, these 8–10-minute recordings were broadcast regularly. Despite the countless uncertainties and sufferings of the war, people made time to listen to Chorompotro because it made them laugh even in the midst of sorrow, despair, and anxiety, while also informing and motivating them about the liberation war against Pakistan.
The language on Pinaki’s YouTube channel is somewhat similar to non-standard, colloquial Bangla. I would argue that his decision to abandon “standard” Bangla in favor of non-standard Bangla is a highly calculated one. The use of non-standard Bangla signals to followers that Pinaki does not practice elite politics. It builds trust by suggesting that since his language resembles that of ordinary people, his politics must prioritize ordinary people’s interests.
“Sexist slang sells. In a society where patriarchal thinking is deeply entrenched, it is hardly surprising that people eagerly consume political discussions infused with patriarchal humor.”
Combined with humor, comedy, and extremely sexist slang, this non-standard language makes Pinaki’s political analysis highly palatable to a massive cis-Bengali-heterosexual-Muslim-male audience. Sexist slang sells. In a society where patriarchal thinking is deeply entrenched, it is hardly surprising that people eagerly consume political discussions infused with patriarchal humor.
Strategy Two: An anti-intellectual stance
Pinaki repeatedly adopts an anti-intellectual position. In the video under discussion, while criticizing the women leaders of NCP who protested NCP’s coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami, Pinaki says, “Some women leaders of NCP have created unnecessary trouble.” According to him, by raising “irrelevant side issues” while working on “national issues,” these women leaders are sabotaging the entire process. Pinaki argues that NCP is now “learning the consequences” of placing “clever, calculative people” in important positions, people who did not go to the streets to fight against the anti-fascist regime. Pinaki’s remark appears to target political leaders like Tasneem Jara, who studied at Viqarunnisa Noon School and Dhaka Medical College, two prestigious academic institutions in Bangladesh, completed a master’s degree at Oxford University, and left a prestigious job in the UK to enter Bangladeshi politics. Pinaki rejects the claim that national politics will collapse without highly educated people.
Appropriating distinctly leftist vocabulary, Pinaki says politics is not a corporate job, not teaching at a university, not practicing medicine or engineering, and that higher education is not a substitute for political organizing experience. Political legitimacy, according to Pinaki, comes from struggling, sacrificing, and taking risks in solidarity with common people. “You may have ascended to the sky with your knowledge, but your people are on the ground”—this, he argues, is the problem with elite politicians. Politicians must speak the language of the ground. Pinaki criticizes former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who held degrees from Oxford and Cambridge Universities, for being part of an “elite consensus.” Pinaki also criticizes the interim government led by Professor Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank and Nobel Peace Prize winner, and formerly a college professor. On the surface, Pinaki consistently opposes “elite” and “technocratic” governance.
Cover image of Pinaki’s video released February 10, 2026, titled “This is Jamaat’s Kaafir Section’s Ameer Speaking”
Pinaki’s critique of elite intellectualism does not necessarily come from a pro-working-class, anti-elite stance. Rather, right-wing populists like Pinaki fear critical thinkers with progressive views who are equipped to dismantle some of his incoherent and inaccurate references and logical fallacies and can oppose his ethno-nationalist, sexist, and xenophobic narratives. For example, Fahmidul Haq, a U.S.-based Bangladeshi researcher, writer, and educator, mentions in his book July Jagoroner Dinlipi (2025) that when he refuted some claims of Pinaki, Pinaki, in response, canceled him publicly in a YouTube video and introduced him to the followers as “Shera Shahbagi” [the best Shahbagi]. The word Shahbagi is a popular Bangla political insult and trolling label widely used in right-wing online and partisan debates to describe overly secular, liberal, and an “urban elite” mindset. Haq further argues that right-wing populist online influencers like Pinaki must pay attention to what increases their followers’ engagement. Therefore, they always try to present what will satisfy and excite their followers, and their analyses usually contain half-truths presented as “evidence.” Haq points out that common followers often lack the knowledge or critical thinking skills to identify the fallacies in the arguments presented. I would argue that tagging highly educated progressives as “elites,” therefore, becomes an effective tactic to cancel them before their critiques of Pinaki gain traction among the public.
Strategy Three: KISS — Keep It Simple and Stupid
Pinaki cites the “KISS – Keep It Simple and Stupid” principle in one of his videos. Pinaki himself says that people don’t read or analyze anymore; they scan and take shortcuts. I would argue that Pinaki understands very well how to attract an audience with no training in critical thinking and no time or intellectual ability to comprehend deep, complex analysis. His main talking points appear repeatedly as animated text, making him very easy to follow. Unlike unappealing long-form text, the spicy combo of Pinaki’s non-standard Bangla, sexist slang, images, animations, and flashy videos is well-equipped to compete with other floating content of social media and hold the attention of his followers.
“Despite his anti-elite and anti-intellectual stance, Pinaki uses a barrage of “references,” ranging from newspaper screenshots to other sources, to reassure followers of his intellectual authority”
Despite his anti-elite and anti-intellectual stance, Pinaki uses a barrage of “references,” ranging from newspaper screenshots to other sources, to reassure followers of his intellectual authority. Since his viewers lack the time or ability to examine various sources and find the “truth,” Pinaki does the “research” for them and delivers a “simple and stupid” truth. However, Pinaki’s content is anything but simple. His content involves careful planning, expert input, a full team to research and execute the plan, and substantial funding. It is implausible that one individual could produce such technologically advanced content at such a high volume, day after day, without sustainable sources of funding.
Strategy Four: Creating an “Other”
A key ingredient of right-wing populism is constructing an “Other” to blame for everything. For example, in the United States, current President Donald Trump has successfully created a large base of support among Americans without a college degree by other-ing immigrants. Scholars have argued that this is not necessarily because of the ignorance of people who haven’t attended college. Rather, people who are not highly educated are statistically more likely to be financially struggling. It is easy to appeal to people who are struggling to make ends meet by saying that they are not getting their fair share, which is being grabbed by an undeserving “Other” (e.g., immigrants or Muslims), and someone will stand up for them.
Currently, Pinaki’s highly effective “Other” is India, and, according to Pinaki, the political party that would stand up for the common people in Bangladesh is the Jamaat-NCP coalition. In a recent video, he identifies Bangladesh’s four main problems: poverty, corruption, unemployment, and the hegemony of India. Poverty, corruption, and unemployment— all make logical sense. But why single out Indian hegemony and avoid any discussions of the Chinese or the American hegemony?
In fact, Pinaki has separate episodes on how to maintain good relations with China and the United States. He even discusses how to maintain diplomatic and economic ties with a belligerent, authoritarian leader like Donald Trump. It seems that he has no problem with U.S. imperialism or China’s neo-imperial expansion in Bangladesh. Bangladesh borrowed $10 billion from China for 14 infrastructure projects under the Hasina government under strict conditions—but Pinaki shows no concern about Bangladesh’s economic dependence on China.
Pinaki Bhattacharya explains how Bangladesh can win America’s heart
Much of what Pinaki says about Indian hegemony is true, but he never dissects the complex political economy of that hegemony or addresses the complicity of the Bangladesh government and civil and corporate elites across the political spectrum who sustain the hegemony and reap its benefits. For example, Maha Mirza points out that the current interim Bangladesh government, allegedly resisting the Indian hegemony, reduced the subsidy for local yarn production from 5 percent to 1.5 percent. As a result, Bangladeshi yarns became much more expensive than Indian yarns that enjoy up to a 15 percent subsidy from the Indian government, along with state protection, investment, and funds to improve production technologies. During the last fiscal year, imports of Indian yarn into Bangladesh increased by 137 percent, while more than 50 Bangladeshi spinning mills closed, losing out to cheaper Indian yarn. So far, the interim government of Bangladesh has imported USD 2 billion worth of yarn, while local yarn worth USD 120 billion remains unsold in stock. Mirza cites a series of other examples of leaving Bangladeshi industries to the mercy of the free market while importing cheaper Indian products that enjoy high levels of subsidy and protection from the Indian state. Mirza argues that the interim government is destroying the economic backbone of Bangladesh while chanting the “Delhi or Dhaka – Dhaka, Dhaka” slogan only to cater to performative populist politics, one akin to Pinaki’s.
Such nuanced and sophisticated analysis is usually never present in Pinaki’s populist rhetoric. Pinaki’s populism needs an “Other,” and now that “Other” is India. He asks his followers to resist the Indian hegemony by voting for the NCP-Jamaat coalition but never addresses why it is important to build a national capacity and self-reliant foundation to confront the unjust terms, conditions, and arrangements as Bangladesh engages in diplomatic and economic negotiations and exchanges with hegemons like India, China, or the United States.
Strategy Five: Co-opting the language of social justice
Pinaki skillfully appropriates the language of social justice. In the video mentioned above, he explains how “big capital” manipulates the state's regulatory mechanisms, how automation enables large corporations to produce at a mass scale and eventually outcompete and crush small- and medium-sized businesses, and how big capital eliminates jobs rather than creating them. He also calls on his followers to dismantle oligarchy.
Yet he remains silent on Jamaat-e-Islami’s massive oligarchic power. Mir Quasem Ali, a founder of Jamaat and Islami Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of Jamaat, raised huge funds from Saudi Arabia and other places. He was the founding vice chairman of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited and owned a wide range of corporations across healthcare, transport, banking, telecom, media, and education. He also owned big businesses like the Ibn Sina Trust, Diganta Media, and the Keari Limited. Jamaat leaders established numerous madrassas across Bangladesh, as well as universities like the Manarat International University and the International Islamic University Chittagong. Jamaat is now actively working to restore the economic power that it lost during the Awami regime. Here, Pinaki’s hollow appropriation of leftist social justice rhetoric becomes clear. He talks about breaking up big capital and oligarchy but remains silent about Jamaat’s huge oligarchic power and NCP’s close proximity to the Jamaat-led oligarchy.
Strategy Six: Storytelling
Pinaki is an exceptional storyteller. Using narratives, data, statistics, videos, and so-called “scholarly” sources, he convinces audiences of the credibility of his arguments while skillfully decrying intellectualism as an elite pursuit. He entertains followers by using sexist slurs against his opponents. He uses colloquial Bangla to connect with the masses. Most of his followers are exhausted by day-to-day struggles for survival. They lack the time, energy, or critical-thinking training to verify Pinaki’s “irrefutable” evidence. They hear what Pinaki says—but they lack the bandwidth to identify what he doesn’t say. That is why Pinaki can mobilize outrageous mobs against Indian influence while conveniently ignoring Chinese or U.S. imperialism. His followers learn to hate cultural and economic elites like Prothom Alo, The Daily Star, and Chhayanaut, while remaining indifferent to Jamaat’s oligarchic power.
Pinaki himself talks about narrative resources as a form of state power. What he doesn’t say is that he himself actively constructs a right-wing populist narrative. From abroad, he continues to influence political, economic, and social institutions and processes in Bangladesh. His populism hijacks the language of social justice and inspires people to dream of dismantling the systemic oppression perpetuated by the elites, but he very cleverly conceals from his followers the fact that his populism serves the interests of certain groups, political parties, and big capital.
Cover image for Pinaki’s video on the attack on Chhayanaut in December 2025 following the death of Sharif Osman Hadi. Title reads “Vandalism at Chhayanaut, Pinaki is furious”.
In Bangladesh, many leftist and progressive populist politicians, academics, and activists have long been engaged in grassroots movements and writing. But the unfortunate truth is that the public does not follow grassroots movements unless the situation becomes extremely dire or directly affects their personal lives and interests. People also lack the patience to read long texts and think them through. The reach of social media among the general population in Bangladesh has now become alarming. Social media has effectively overridden all other sources of information, including the mainstream media, books, newspapers, magazines, and other educational sources. If alternative and genuinely anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, decolonial, and feminist progressive narratives are not created and circulated on social media, the reach of Pinaki and so-called populist “activists” like him will continue to grow.
The general public will entrust these populists, like Pinaki, with the responsibility of knowledge production and unquestioningly accept them as authoritative figures. Exploiting this opportunity, Pinaki and his ilk will continue to popularize their politics of nationalist hatred and violence while consolidating their own interests. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s working people, women, religiously minoritized communities, Indigenous communities, people of diverse gender identities, and all those in various marginalized and minoritized positions—who are far removed from being part of the big capital as Pinaki insinuates—will continue to suffer from hardships day after day, with no sign of hope.
Editor’s Note: An earlier version of this piece was originally published in Bangla on Bangladesh Feminist Archive. The piece has been updated and translated for Jamhoor by the author.
Nafisa Nipun Tanjeem is an educator, researcher, writer, and organizer. She currently serves as an Associate Professor in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies at Worcester State University in the United States.